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This dispute between Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly with its affiliate Burns Concrete, Inc., 
"Burns") and Teton County, Idaho ("Teton County") arises out of the terms of the Developer's 
Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC (the "Agreement") attached as Exhibit i to both Burns' 
Complain/ and the Appellants' Brief filed in this appeal and as Exhibit B to the Respondent's 
Brief filed in this appeal. 
Teton County's manifestly unfair treatment of Burns under the Agreement is illustrated 
by the following undisputed facts. 
• Before Burns purchased the real property at issue in this lawsuit, both Teton 
County and the City of Driggs designated the property as the specific site where 
burns should construct a concrete batch plant (the "Permanent Facility"). 
Complaint ,i 23 (R, p. 7). 
• Following execution of the Agreement, Burns expended many hundreds of 
thousands of dollars constructing and implementing the commitments imposed 
under the Agreement, including without limitation (a) erecting and operating a 
temporary concrete batch plant (the "Temporary Facility") required under 
Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement, which required Burns to incur substantial 
expense for site demolition, remediating the site for prior waste disposal, clearing 
and grubbing the site, extending utilities to the site, and transporting to and 
erecting on the site the Temporary Facility; (b) constructing the road and highway 
1 
Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract and 
Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013 ("Complaint") [R, pp. 1-24]. 
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improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement, which required 
Bums to incur substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete foundations, 
new tum lanes, landscaping, and performance bonds; and (c) applying for and 
taking all actions necessary to obtain the CUP and zoning variance required to 
construct the Permanent Facility. Complaint 1 17 [R, p. 6]. 
• Bums undertook every act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and zoning 
variance required by Teton County for Bums to construct the Permanent Facility, 
both of which Teton County refused to issue. Complaint 120 [R, p. 6]. 
• Bums cannot now construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment to the 
ordinances of Teton County. Complaint 121 [R, p. 7]. 
• Bums has operated the Temporary Facility in accordance with the tenns of the 
Agreement; however, Bums has not ever been able to construct the Permanent 
Facility by reason of action and inaction by Teton County over which Bums has 
no control. Complaint 125 [R, p. 7]. 
• Nevertheless, Teton County seeks to rezone Bums' property to preclude its use as 
a concrete batch plant and force Bums to remove the Temporary Facility from the 
property, with Teton County maintaining the "free" public road improvements 
Bums was contractually obligated to construct under the Agreement and without 
reimbursing Bums for any of the several hundred thousand dollars in out-of-
pocket costs Bums was contractually obligated to incur. 
-2-
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II. RESPONSE TO UNSUPPORTED AND DISPUTED FACTUAL ASSERTIONS 
At no point during the litigation of this case, including in either Appellants' Brie
f or 
Respondent's Brief, has Burns or Teton County asserted that the Agreement is ambigu
ous in any 
respect. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgm
ent, filed 
December 19, 2014, at 8 ("Both parties agree that the Agreement is not ambiguous.")
 [R, p. 125]. 
Because the Agreement is not ambiguous, the following rule for construing its te
rms 
applies: 
Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the legal 
effect must be decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is 
only when the instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence 
as to the meaning of that instrument may be submitted to the finder 
of fact. 
Knipe Land Co. v. Roberfson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P 3d 595, 601 (2011). See als
o Potlatch 
Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 12
80 (2010) 
('"In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary
 and proper 
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument."
' (Citation 
omitted.)). In addition to the application of the parol-evidence rule to the interpret
ation of the 
Agreement, Idaho precedent requires that all factual matters considered in the a
ppeal to be 
included in the record on appeal. Feld v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1
014, 1017, 
895 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1995) ("Questions or matters not presented in the record 
will not be 
considered by this Court on appeal."). Teton County has repeatedly violated thes
e two legal 
principles in Respondent's Brief 
Thus, in an effort to discredit Burns and thereby avoid the unambiguous terms of
 the 
Agreement, Teton County has quoted from, characterized, and attached copies of tra
nscripts for 
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hearings held by the Teton County Board of Commissioners on February 26, 2007, which was 
six months before the Agreement was executed, and on November 15, 2007, which was more 
than two months after the Agreement was executed. See Respondent's Brief 2-3, 5-6, 8-9 and 
Exs. A & C. Neither of these transcripts (nor any of the quoted statements) are inciuded in the 
record on appeal. Nor does Teton County provide any argument or authority establishing why 
consideration of the statements contained in these transcripts is not barred by the parol-evidence 
rule. Moreover, a fair reading of the February 26 transcript establishes that the Teton County 
Commissioners, or at least their chairman, understood "issues like building height and so on and 
so forth are going to be hammered out in this development agreement." Respondent's Brie/Ex. 
A, p. 17, LL. 7-9. (See also id. at p. 25, LL. 7-11, where Kirk Burns qualified his response to 
Chairman Young's question, "what square footage and what height?" by stating: "We don't 
have that completely worked out.") Finally, the comments at the February 26 hearing attributed 
to Kirk Burns on page 2 of Respondent's Brief are all attributed in the transcript itself to an 
unidentified "Voice." Id. at pp. 31-32. And for all the foregoing reasons, those portions of 
Respondent's Brief identified in this paragraph should be wholly disregarded by the Court in 
deciding this appeal. 
But in addition to violating the parol-evidence rule and relying on factual matters not in 
the record on appeal, Teton County has also repeatedly asserted "facts" for which there is no 
possible support and misstated the express terms of the unambiguous Agreement, including in 
the following instances: 
1. Teton County asserts that "the Agreement also allowed Burns to construct and 
operate a temporary facility .... " Respondent's Brie/I (emphasis added). But Paragraph 2.b(v) 
-4-
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of the Agreement expressly provides that Bums "shall erect and operate a temporary concrete 
batch plant on site .... " (Emphasis added.) 
2. Teton County asserts that "Bums was required to bring their private road up to 
public works standards." Respondent's Brief l (emphasis added). However, not only is there 
nothing in the record suggesting that Bums even has a private road, but Paragraphs 2.c and 
2.d(iv) of the Agreement expressly provide that the road improvements Bums was required to 
construct were to State Highway 33 and Casper Lane, which are both public roads and not 
private ones. See also Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed November 5, 2014, at ,r,r 3-4 [R, p. 89]. 
3. Teton County asserts that "Burns attached a sketch of their desired building as 
Exhibit "C" to the Agreement." Respondent's Brief3 ( emphasis added). But there is no support 
m the record or in fact for this assertion, which Burns denies. 
4. Teton County asserts: "There is nothing in the body of the Agreement that states 
that the height of the building shall be 75 feet. . . . Paragraph 2(b )(iii) simply identifies Exhibit 
"C" as containing 'plans for construction of Developer's intended permanent facility.'" 
Respondent's Brief 8 ( emphasis in original). Yet Paragraph 2. b(iii) of the Agreement actually 
provides: "Attached as Exhibit "B"-Site Plan, and Exhibit "C"-Building Elevations, and by 
this reference incorporated herein are plans for construction of Developer's intended permanent 
facility ("Permanent Facility")." (Emphasis added.) And Exhibit "C" to the Agreement clearly 
depicts the Permanent Facility as being 75' high. 
5. Teton County asserts that "Bums could build something that complies with 
current zoning, yet they refuse." Respondent's Briefl 1. But there is no support in the record or 
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in fact for this assertion, and Bums disputes that it 1s economically feasible to limit the 
Permanent Facility to only 45' in height. 
6. Teton County asserts that "Bums hoped that by inserting an exhibit into the zone 
change agreement that depicted their desired facility, that the Board would be bound to approve 
their application to build the 75-foot tall facility." Respondent's Brief 12 (emphasis added). But 
there is no support in the record or in fact for this assertion either, which Bums denies. 
7. Teton County asserts that "Burns could have built a concrete batch plant that 
complied with zoning restrictions." Respondent's Brie/20. But again there is no support in the 
record or in fact for this assertion, and Burns disputes that it is economically feasible to build any 
concrete batch plant of only 45' in height. 
8. Teton County asserts: "Paragmph 2(b)(iii) of the Agreement contains the only 
reference to Exhibit "C," calling it 'plans for construction of Developer's intended permanent 
facility.' The use of the word "intended" hardly supports a mandate that this exact building must 
be constructed." Respondent's Brie/20-21. Yet Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibits "B" and "C" of 
the Agreement first specify the site plan and building elevations for the Permanent Facility, and 
Paragraph 2.b(iv) then provides: "Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer 
shall order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility." (Emphasis added.) 
9. Teton County asserts that "Burns has explored no avenue for building other than 
the 75 foot tall plant." Respondent's Brie/21. But there is also no support in the record or in 
fact for this assertion, which Burns denies. 
10. Teton County asserts that "[t]he purpose of the Agreement is to rezone the 
property to M-1, not to waive the height restriction in the M-1 zone." Respondent's Brief 22. 
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the second recital in the Agreement specifically states that "the Developer has requested the 
zone change for the purpose of developing a concrete batch plant facility ... ," and the third 
recital establishes that Teton County entered into the Agreement ''for the purpose of allowing, by 
agreement, a specific development to proceed in a specific area and for a specific purpose or 
use .... " (Emphasis added.) 
11. Teton County asserts that "the only position that the Board took on the height of 
the structure occurred at a public hearing where a conditional use permit was denied ... and at a 
public hearing where a variance was denied .... " Respondent's Brief23. Yet Teton County 
admits in its Answer that it entered into the Agreement and caused the Agreement to be recorded 
in the office of the Teton County Clerk, Answer ,i 16 [R, p. 27], and Exhibit "C" of the 
Agreement expressly depicts the Permanent Facility as being 75' high. See also the signature 
page of the Agreement, which is impressed with the official seal of Teton County. 
12. Teton County asserts that "[t]he fact that Burns improved its own property does 
not create an advantage for the County .... " Respondent's Brief 24 ( emphasis added). Yet as 
pointed out in paragraph 2 above, the road improvements Bums was required to construct were 
to State Highway 33 and Casper Lane, which are both public roads-and if these public 
improvements did not advantage Teton County, why on earth did it require Bums to construct 
them? 
13. Teton County asserts "that Bums agreed to and benefittedfrom the improvements 
they made." Respondent's Brief 25 ( emphasis added). But again there is no support in the 
record or in fact for this assertion, which Bums disputes. 
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14. Teton County similarly asserts that "the temporary facility, which utilizes both the 
highway and road, has continued operating to Burns' benefit." Respondent's Brie/26 ( emphasis 
added). But there is also no support in the record or in fact for the assertion that Bums has ever 
operated the Temporary Faciiity at a profit, and Burns most vehemently denies that it has. 
15. Teton County asserts that "[t]he temporary plant exceeds the height limit allowed 
in its zone .... [and] has violated the law for over eight years .... " Respondent's Brief 26. But 
once again there is no support in the record or in fact for these assertions, which Bums disputes. 
16. Teton County also asserts "[i]t is undisputed that the Temporary Facility is 70 feet 
tall .... [and] violates the height regulation in the M-1 zone." Respondent's Brie/27. But there 
is also no support in the record or in fact for these assertions, which Burns disputes. 
Finally, in contrast to the f01egoing numerous misstatements by Teton County, ,;vhich 
form the essence of its equitable arguments, Burns requests this Court to take notice that Teton 
County has not disputed a single asserted fact or term of the Agreement contained in Appellants ' 
Brief 
III. REBUTTAL OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
Teton County's legal arguments are founded on two general contentions set forth in the 
introduction to its argument. The first of these contentions is as follows: 
Yet Burns' entire argument is [i] based on the idea that the 
Agreement somehow allows them to build a 75-foot tall building, 
and [ii] that the County is preventing them, or making it impossible 
for them to do so. 
Respondent's Brie/7-8. 
Teton County, however, misstates the first leg of its foregoing compound contention (i.e., 
that Burns believes the Agreement allows Burns to build the 75' Permanent Facility). Rather, 
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Burns' argument is that the Agreement requires Burns to build the 75' Permanent Facility and 
that the very same paragraph imposing this construction obligation also extends the time for 
Burns to do so when delayed by "action beyond Developer's control." Agreement 12.b(iv). 
Moreover, the second ieg of Teton County's compound contention (i.e., that Teton County has 
prevented Burns from constructing the Permanent Facility) is both indisputable-as well as 
undisputed by Teton County-and the very reason that the time for Burns to satisfy its 
construction obligation has been extended under Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement. 
The second general contention on which Teton County's legal argument is founds is as 
follows: 
More importantly, the Board of County Commissioners could not 
have contracted for a 30-foot deviation from the height ordinance. 
Paragrnph I2(f) of the Agreement contains a clause that "If any 
term of this agreement is declared invalid, illegal or unenforceable, 
the remainder of this agreement shall remain operative and 
binding." A contract provision that requires a party to violate the 
law by building a structure 30 feet in excess of what the zoning 
ordinance allows, is invalid, illegal and unenforceable. 
Respondent's Brief 8. 
But in making the foregoing argument Teton County ignores the following undisputed 
facts and interrelated contractual provisions: 
• The parties at all times concurred that Burns was required to obtain Teton 
County's approval for constructing the Permanent Facility, and, as Teton County 
points out, over two months before the Agreement was executed "Burns applied 
for a conditional use permit (CUP) on June 13, 2007." Respondent's Brie/3. 
• Paragraph 10 of the Agreement requires Bums to comply with all "county and 
local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject property." 
-9-
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• Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement doesn't only require Bums to construct the 
Permanent Facility within 18 months, but it also extends the time for Burns to do 
so when delayed by "action beyond Developer's control." 
• Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement doesn't only require Bums to construct "a 
temporary concrete batch plant on site ... ," but it also allows Bums to operate 
the Temporary Facility until the Permanent Facility can be constructed. 
Thus, not only did the Agreement require Burns to comply with all of Teton County's zoning 
ordinances, but the Agreement provided for Burns' use of its property as contemplated by the 
parties (i.e., as a concrete batch plant) from the date the Agreement was executed though today. 
Or stated otherwise, and contrary to Teton County's quoted argument, there is no "contract 
prov1s1on that requires [Burns] to violate the law by building a structwe 30 feet in excess of what 
the zoning ordinance allows ... "
2 
Rather, what the Agreement requires is for Burns to continue 
to operate the Temporary Facility as it has been doing until Burns can construct the Permanent 
Facility. See Agreement 1 5 ("if the property ... is not used as approved, or if the approved use 
ends or is abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may ... order that the property will 
revert to the [prior] zoning designation zone .... "). 
2 
In the unlikely event the Agreement was held to be void, Bums pleaded an alternative 
claim (Count III) against Teton County for unjust enrichment and the recovery of restitution 
damages. Complaint 139 [R, p. 10]. 
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A. The Force Majeure Clause Suspends Burns' Obligation to Construct the 
Permanent Facility. 
Bums' position with respect to the application of the Force Majeure Clause
3 
is not that 
Teton County breached the Agreement or otherwise acted wrongfully when it denied Bums the 
zoning approvals and building permit required for construction of the Permanent Facility, but 
rather that Teton County's actions in denying the required zoning approvals and building permit 
requested by Bums were "actions beyond the Developer's control." And nowhere does Teton 
County contend that its actions in denying the requested approvals and permits were within 
Bums' control or that Bums might have constructed the Permanent Facility without first 
obtaining the requested approvals and permits. Thus, Teton County must argue that the 
unambiguous phrase "action beyond Developer's control" should be construed so as to exclude 
Teton County's actions in denying Bums the zoning approvals and building permit required for 
construction of the Permanent Facility. 
In arguing that the wording of the Force Majeure Clause should not be construed to mean 
what it says, Teton County does not distinguish any of the following Idaho legal principles and 
precedents argued by Burns in Appellants' Brief 
• '"In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, 
ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain 
3 
Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
The installation of the Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18) 
months of execution of this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting 
from weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other 
act of force maj eure or action beyond Developer's control. 
(Underscoring added.) (The foregoing contractual provision is hereinafter referred to as the 
"Force Majeure Clause.") 
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wording of the instrument."' Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, supra, 151 Idaho at 
454, 259 P.3d at 600 (quoting Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 
285, supra, 148 Idaho at 633,226 P.3d at 1280). 
• "We must construe this contract so as to give effect to every part of it, if 
• 
possible." Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, l 06 Idaho 742, 749-50, 682 P.2d 1289, 
1296-97 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Wright v. Village of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 117 
P.2d 1002 (1941). Accord Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 
731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000); Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Crowley, 
124 Idaho 132, 137, 857 P.2d 611, 616 (1993); George v. Univ. of Idaho, 121 
Idaho 30, 36, 822 P.2d 549, 555 (Ct. App. 1991). 
"This Court has no 'rnving powe1 to rcvvrite contracts to make them more 
equitable.' Thus, when weighing various interpretations of contracts, we consider 
the language of the agreement as 'the best indication of [the parties'] intent."' 
City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 437, 299 P.3d 232, 244 (2013) 
(internal and concluding citations omitted). 
Accordingly, in its attempt to avoid the result dictated by the foregoing legal principles 
and precedents and the plain meaning of the Force Majeure Clause, Teton County argues that 
"[t]he act of force majeure or action beyond the Developer's control that Burns points to is the 
45-foot height regulation that was in place at the time the property was purchased .... " 
Respondent's Brief l 0. But this plainly misstates Bums' position, which, as stated above, is that 
Teton County's actions in denying the requested zoning approvals and building permit were 
"actions beyond the Developer's Control." 
-12-
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Teton County next argues facts not supported by the record and disputed by
 Bums (i.e., 
"Bums could build something that complies with current zoning, yet th
ey refuse.") for the 
conclusion: "Refusal to build a structure that complies with the law is n
ot a force majeure." 
Respondent's Brief ii. But nothing in the Agreement gives Burns the right t
o construct anything 
other than the 75' Permanent Facility, and nothing in the record supports a 
finding that it would 
be economically feasible for Burns to construct a concrete batch plant 
of less than 75' in 
height-let alone one complying with the existing 45' height limitation. 
Teton County then argues that, because Bums assumed Teton County would
 approve the 
required approvals and permits that were requested, "Bums assumed the
 risk of obtaining a 
permit to exceed the height regulation .... " Respondent's Brief 11. Bums d
enies this is so. But 
even if it were for some reason, Bums also obtained the related contractual
 rights (i) to extend 
the deadline for constructing the Permanent Facility if delayed by "
actions beyond the 
Developer's Control[,]" and (ii) to operate the Temporary Facility until the
 Permanent Facility 
can be constructed. Moreover, none of the authorities cited by Teton 
County support the 
proposition that action otherwise constituting an event of force majeure take
n by one contracting 
party (such as Teton County's action in denying the requested zoning app
rovals and building 
permit) might constitute a risk assumed by the other contracting party, an
d therefore each of 
Teton County's cited authorities is readily distinguishable.
4 
Nor does it even remotely make 
4 
The readily distinguishable authorities cited by Teton County in support of i
ts argument 
that, because Burns assumed Teton County would approve the required ap
provals and permits 
that were requested, "Bums assumed the risk of obtaining a permit to
 exceed the height 
regulation" are as follows: Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760
 N.E.2d 453, 455-56 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (relating to a party's defense of force majeure with re
spect to its inability 
to purchase a commodity at a favorable price from a third person for resale
 to the other party); 
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sense that Bums would voluntarily assume the risk of what Teton County might do aft
er Bums 
incurred several hundred thousand dollars in out-of-pocket costs in constructing th
e public 
improvements and other work it was contractually obligated to Teton County to imm
ediately 
construct. 
Nevertheless, relying solely on the opinion of the federal district court for Rhode Islan
d 
in URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Board of Governors for Higher Ed
ucation, 
915 F. Supp. 1267 (D.R.I. 1996), Teton County argues that Bums should be held 
to have 
assumed the risk that Teton County would deny Burns the required zoning appro
vals and 
building permit it had requested because these denials were "foreseeable." 
The district court's opinion in URI Cogeneration Partners and the New York opinion o
n 
which it is purpm tedly based, Kel Kim Corporation v. Central l,!arkets, lnc , 519 N 
E 2d 295 
(N. Y. 1987), are distinguished and discussed, respectively, in Appellants' Brief Also d
iscussed 
in Appellants' Brief in conjunction with analyzing these two opinions is the appella
te court 
opinion in Specialty Foods of Indiana, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 
2013), which held as follows: 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 706 F.2d 444, 448-49 (3d Ci
r. 1983) 
(relating to a party's defense of force majeure with respect to its insufficient product
ion of a 
commodity for sale to a third person for reasons not attributable to the other party); 
Dunaj v. 
Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (Ohio C.P. 1990) (relating to a party's defense 
of force 
majeure with respect to the inability to meet its performance standards for reas
ons not 
attributable to the other party); Buono Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 363 F.2d 43
, 44 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (relating to a party's defense of force majeure with respect to its discontinua
nce of a 
product line for reasons not attributable to the other party); Austin Co. v. United
 States, 
314 F.2d 518, 519 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (relating to a plaintiffs claim to recover its expenses 
incurred 
under a contract that was terminated, where the "plaintiffs failure to perform was solel
y due to 
the fact that it was impossible for it to manufacture a workable system as set fort
h in the 
specifications, which were the plaintiffs own design."). Again, none of these authorit
ies hold, 
not even suggest, that a contracting party's action otherwise constituting an event 
of force 
majeure might constitute a risk assumed by the other contracting party. 
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The parties agree that the specific language from the force majeure 
provision in the UMO Agreement with which we are concerned is 
the phrase "any other reason not within the reasonable control of 
Century Center." 
Specialty Foods argues that the force majeure provision of 
the UMO Agreement is inapplicable to excuse the Century 
Center's performance because the termination of the Management 
and License Agreements was "not unforeseeable." However, the 
force majeure provision in this case contains nothing about 
foreseeability, and Specialty Foods points to neither terms in the 
provision nor in the remainder of the parties' contract in support of 
its argument. The scope and effect of a force ma1eure clause 
depends on the specific contract language. 
Further, there is no evidence before us that the bargaining 
between the parties was not free and open. The City, the Century 
Center, and Specialty Foods are sophisticated parties presumably 
represented by counsel who were at liberty to define the nature of 
force majeure in whatever manner they desired. We decline to 
re¥.rrite the parties' contract by interjecting into the force maj eure 
provision a requirement of foreseeability. 
Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 27 (internal and concluding citations omitted). 
5 
And as is 
pointed out in Appellants' Brief multiple other courts have also rejected the "foreseeable" 
limitation imposed on force majeure clauses in URI Cogeneration Partners for the reasons 
articulated in Specialty Foods. See, e.g., Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P'ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1248 
(5th Cir. 1990); Vinegar Hill Zinc Co. v. United States, 276 F.2d 13, 15-16 (Ct. CL 1960). 
Finally, Teton County attempts to distinguish the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in 
Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000), which Bums 
5 
Teton County attempts to distinguish the foregoing holding by arguing: "the loss of the 
Hall of Fame completely obviated the need for a food and beverage vendor for the Hall of Fame. 
That there be a Hall of Fame in South Bend was a basic assumption of their agreement." 
Respondent's Brief 13-14. However, this argued "distinction" fails for the obvious reason that 
Burns' construction of the Permanent Facility was also a basic assumption of the Agreement. 
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also relied upon and extensively discussed in Appellants' Brief, with Teton County 
arguing: 
"The force majeure clause in Idaho Power specifically contemplates the revoc
ation or 
suspension of government permits." Respondent's Brief 14. Yet the relevant portion of
 the force 
majeure clause in Idaho Power merely provided as follows: 
[F]orce majeure or an event of force majeure means any cause 
beyond the control of the Seller or of Idaho Power which, despite 
the exercise of due diligence, such Party is unable to prevent or 
overcome, including but not limited to an act of God, fire, flood, 
explosion, strike, sabotage, an act of the public enemy, civil or 
military authority, court orders, laws or regulations, insurrection 
or riot, an act of the elements or lack of precipitation resulting in 
reduced water flows for power production purposes. 
134 Idaho at 747-48, 9 P.3d at 1213-14 (bolding in original). Thus, notwithstandin
g Teton 
County's assertion to the contrary, there is no reference at all in the foregoing provisio
n to "the 
revocation or suspension of government permits," but only a vague reference to "civil or
 military 
authority." 
Moreover, similar indiscrete references were held not sufficient to trigger application o
f 
the force majeure clause in URI Cogeneration Partners,
6 
which is the principal authority relied 
6 
The relevant portion of the force majeure clause at issue in URI Cogeneration Partners 
is as follows: 
As used in this Agreement, "Force Majeure" means causes beyond the 
reasonable control of and without the fault or negligence of the party claiming 
Force Majeure. If either Party shall be unable to carry out any of its obligations 
under this Agreement due to events beyond the reasonable control of and without 
the fault or negligence of the party claiming Force Majeure-including, but not 
limited to an act of God; sabotage; accidents; appropriation or diversion of steam 
energy, equipment, materials or commodities by rule or order of any 
governmental or judicial authority having jurisdiction thereof; any changes in 
applicable laws or regulations affecting performance; war; blockage; insurrection; 
riot; labor dispute; labor or material shortage; fuel storage; fire; explosion; flood; 
nuclear emergency; epidemic; landslide; lightning; earthquake or similar 
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upon by Teton County. And for this reason the opinion of the federal distric
t court for Rhode 
Island in Teton County's principal authority is irreconcilable with the opi
nion of the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Idaho Power. 
Accordingiy, application of the Agreement's Force l'vfajeure Clause should 
be held to 
have suspended Burns' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility. 
B. The Doctrine of Prevention Suspends or Discharges Burns' Obligatio
n to 
Construct the Permanent Facility. 
Just as with its position concerning the application of the Force Majeure Clau
se, Bums' 
position with respect to the application of the doctrine of prevention is not 
that Teton County 
breached the Agreement when it denied Burns the zoning approvals and buildi
ng permit required 
for construction of the Permanent Facility. Burns' position, rather, is th
at in denying the 
requested zoning approvals and building permit, Teton County acted "outsi
de the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed." Sullivan v. B
ullock, 124 Idaho 
738, 743, 864 P.2d 184, 189 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding the evidence supported
 the jury's verdict 
that "when Mrs. Sullivan denied [Bullock] any further access to the home she
 acted in a manner 
that was outside the contemplation of the contract or the parties when 
they executed the 
contract."). Accord Peck Ormsby Constr. Co. v. City of Rigby, No. CV 10-
545-S-WBS, 2012 
WL 5273087, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 22, 2012) (finding a genuine issue of mater
ial fact precluding 
summary judgment "[s]ince it is not clear that rejection ... was 'outsid
e the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed"' (quoting Sulliva
n)). 
catastrophic occurrence-this Agreement shall remain in effect, but the affec
ted 
Party's obligations shall be suspended for the period the affected Party is una
ble 
to perform because of the disabling circumstances provided that: .... 
915 F.Supp. at 1276. 
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Teton County therefore misleadingiy frames Idaho law when it argues, without 
explaining the judicial gloss applied to the terms it uses, that "in order for the doctrine of 
prevention to apply, the actions of the party preventing performance must somehow be improper, 
wrongful, or in excess of their iegal rights." Respondent's Brief 15. And for this reason, Teton 
County's extensive justification of its actions under the Local Land Use Planning Act are wholly 
beside the point. 
Moreover, Teton County has completely failed to address the factual questions 
determining the application of the prevention doctrine to the present dispute, as presented in 
Appellants' Brief. Or as there argued, the question with respect to whether the prevention 
doctrine here applies under Idaho law is whether, at the time the Agreement was executed on 
August 31, 2007, the par ties contemplated that Teton County would deny Burns the CUP and 
building permit required to construct the Permanent Facility and then, two years later, would first 
contest the validity of the applicable ordinance in order to avoid issuing Burns the zoning 
approvals Bums required. 
And as also argued by Bums in Appellants' Brief, because Paragraphs 2.b(iv)-(v) of the 
Agreement require Bums to immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility and 
to erect and operate the Temporary Facility, rather than delaying or conditioning Bums' 
performance until after Teton County approved the CUP application that was then pending 
before it, there can be no genuine question but that the parties contemplated Teton County would 
promptly issue Burns the CUP and building permit required to construct the Permanent Facility 
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when they executed the Agreement.
7 
Indeed, construction of the Permanent Facility without the 
CUP and a building permit would have been both illegal and proscribed by the terms of the 
Agreement. 
8 
Therefore, unless Teton County intended for Burns to immediately breach the 
Agreement by either failing to commence construction of the Permanent Facility or by 
commencing construction before obtaining the required CUP and building permit-something 
Teton County has never asserted-Teton County must necessarily have "contemplated" it would 
promptly approve and issue the CUP Burns required when Teton County executed the 
9 
Agreement on or about August 31, 2007. 
Accordingly, application of the doctrine of prevention should be held to have suspended 
or discharged Bums' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility based on the holding in 
Sullivan v. Bullock and the reasons discussed in Appellants' Brief 
C. The Doctrine of Impossibility Suspends or Discharges Burns' Obligation to 
Construct the Permanent Facility. 
Burns argues in Appellants' Brief that the doctrine of impossibility should be held to have 
suspended or discharged Burns' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility based on the 
7 
If Paragraphs 2.b(iv)-(v) of the Agreement were not dispositive, there would then be a 
genuine issue as to a material fact. See Sullivan, 124 Idaho at 743 n.2, 864 P.2d at 189. 
However, Teton County has not submitted a scintilla of evidence supporting a finding that the 
parties did not intend Burns to immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility 
following execution of the Agreement. Nor could any such evidence be considered without 
violating the parol-evidence rule. 
8 
See Agreement 1 10 ("Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state, county and 
local laws, rules and regulations, which pertain to the subject property."). 
9 
The City of Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 (or over a 
month prior to the execution of the Agreement) and unanimously recommended for approval by 
Teton County both the Agreement and the CUP requested by Burns. Complaint 115 [R, p. 5]. 
Teton County admits this fact in paragraph 15 of its Answer. [R, p. 27.] 
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opinion m Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252, 706 P.2d 1363 (Ct. App. 1985), and the 
application of Sections 261, 264, and 266 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) 
(hereinafter the "Restatement"). Teton County does not discuss, let alone rebut, any of the legal 
principles in the Restatement discussed in Appellants · Brief, which Burns contends should 
determine the question of whether the impossibility doctrine applies to the present dispute. Th
e 
arguments Teton County does make with respect to the application of the doctrine are discusse
d 
below in the same sequence made in Respondent's Brief 
Teton County first argues the ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court that the CUP Burns 
sought could not be obtained because a provision in the relevant zoning ordinance was void
10 
"was not a new law." Respondent's Brief 19. But as discussed and quoted in Appellants' Brief, 
and not rebutted by Teton County, the Restatement extends application of the impossibility 
doctrine to "where a judicial decision is handed down after the time that the contract was mad
e 
giving an unanticipated interpretation to a statute enacted before that time." RESTATEMENT
 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266, cmt. a. 
Next Teton County argues that "because Burns was aware that zoning approval was 
necessary, the doctrine of impossibility is not applicable." Respondent's Brief 20. But as argued 
in Appellants' Brief, and also not rebutted by Teton County, the difference between Burns having 
to obtain the CUP, as the parties expected when the Agreement was executed, or a variance, a
s 
the Idaho Supreme Court held to be required and for which the Property does not qualify, i
s 
material for multiple reasons. See Burns Holdings I, 152 Idaho at 444-45, 272 P.3d at 416-417. 
10 
See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 152 Idaho 440, 443-44, 272 
P.3d 412, 415-16 (2012) (hereinafter "Burns Holdings I"). 
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fact, as a result of the change in the required approval Bums was deprived of any and all 
ability it had to construct the 75' Permanent Facility, including through a judicial challenge to 
Teton County's denial of the CUP. 
Teton County then argues that the impossibility doctrine "is aiso not applicable to the 
Development Agreement signed by the parties because Bums could have built a concrete plant 
that complied with zoning restrictions." Respondent's Brief 20. But this and the related 
assertions Teton County makes with respect to what Bums could construct are contested above 
on the grounds that there is no support in the record or in fact for the assertions and that Teton 
County has misstated the terms of the Agreement. See supra Part II at ,r,r 7-9. 
Teton County's penultimate argument is that "Appellants have made no showing that a 
building height of 75 feet was a basic assumption on which the parties agreed." Respondent's 
Brief 22. But this assertion is also contested above on the grounds that Teton County has 
misstated the purpose of the Agreement as set forth in the second and third recitals to the 
Agreement, which establish that Bums' purpose was to "develop[] a concrete batch plant 
facility ... " and that Teton County's purpose was to "allow[], by agreement, a specific 
development to proceed in a specific area and for a specific purpose or use .... " See supra 
Part II at ,I 10. See also Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibits "B" and "C" of the Agreement, which 
specify the site plan and building elevations for the Permanent Facility, and Paragraph 2.b(iv), 
which requires Bums to immediately "order and commence construction of the Permanent 
Facility." 
Finally Teton County argues: "The height was not a basic assumption upon which both 
parties made the contract. The law does not allow either the County or the applicant to assume 
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the land use application would be granted." Respondent's Brief 23 ( emphasis in original). Ye
t 
Teton County fails to cite any authority establishing what the law does or does not allow. And
 
even more to the point, the issue relating to the impossibility doctrine arises out of the
 
determination by the Idaho Supreme Court in Burns Holdings I that the CUP Bums sought could
 
not be obtained because a variance was instead required-which ruling established the
 
impossibility of Bums constructing the Permanent Facility-and does not relate to Teton
 
County's denial of Bums' CUP application. 
Accordingly, application of the doctrine of impossibility should be held to have 
suspended or discharged Bums' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility based on the
 
holding in Landis v. Hodgson and the legal principles set forth in Sections 261, 264, and 266 of
 
the Restatement discussed in Appellants 'B, ief 
D. The Doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel Should Apply and Estop Teton County from 
Rezoning Burns' Property. 
Teton County does not dispute Bums' statement of controlling law for its defense that 
Teton County should be estopped from rezoning Bums' property, including Bums' contention
 
that the elements of quasi-estoppel under Idaho law are as follows: 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending 
party took a different position than his or her original position, and 
(2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to 
change positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to permit the 
offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or 
she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 





Teton County instead disputes Bums' contention that not only is the first element of 
quasi-estoppel satisfied in this controversy, but so is each and every one of the alternative 
grounds contained in the second element. 
Thus, Teton County argues with respect to element #1 that "the only position that the 
Board took on the height of the structure occurred at a public hearing where a conditional use 
permit was denied ... and at a public hearing where a variance was denied .... " Respondent's 
Brief23. Yet as Bums notes above, Teton County admits in its Answer that it entered into the 
Agreement and caused the Agreement to be recorded in the office of the Teton County Clerk, 
and Exhibit "C" of the Agreement expressly depicts the Permanent Facility as being 75' high. 
See supra Part II at 1 11. 
Teton County argues with respect to element #2.a (the first of the three alternatives under 
the second element of quasi-estoppel) that Teton County didn't gain an advantage or cause a 
disadvantage to Bums because (i) "Bums improved its own property," Respondent's Brief24; 
(ii) "Bums agreed to and benefitted from the improvements they made," id. at 25; and (iii) "the 
temporary facility, which utilizes both the highway and road, has continued operating to Bums' 
benefit," id. at 26. But each of the foregoing assertions are contested by Bums on the grounds 
that Teton County has misstated the terms of the Agreement and that there is no support in the 
record or in fact for the assertions. See supra Part II at 11 12-14. 
Moreover, Teton County effectively concedes satisfaction of the second element of quasi-
estoppel because Teton County makes no argument at all with respect to alternative element #2.b 
(i.e., that Bums was induced by Teton County to change positions), nor with respect to 
alternative element #2.c (i.e., that it would be unconscionable to permit Teton County to 
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maintain an inconsistent position from the one by which it obtained the public road and highway 
improvements Bums constructed and after Burns incurred several hundred thousand dollars in 
out-of-pocket costs in constructing the public improvements and other work it was contractually 
obligated to Teton County to immediateiy construct). 
Teton County does argue, however, that "[t]he only indication of exigent circumstances 
given by Burns is their assertion that they have expended a large sum of money." Respondent's 
Brief 25. But with respect to these expenditures Bums asks: If being induced into constructing 
public road and highway improvements for the benefit of one contracting party through the grant 
of contractual rights to the constructing party does not constitute "exigent circumstances," what 
on earth does? Cf Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 201, 207 P.3d at 177 (where the Supreme Court found 
the absence of "exigent circumstances" because "Applicants have not asserted that actions of the 
Board induced them to change positions."). 
Accordingly, Teton County should be held to be estopped from rezoning Burns' property 
based on the opinion in Terrazas v. Blaine County and the reasons discussed in Appellants' Brief 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above and in Appellants' Brief, Bums contends that there is no 
basis in the record or the law supporting the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Teton 
County. Bums therefore respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment in 
favor of Teton County, including the award of attorney fees, and to remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. 
Finally, because the ultimate disposition of the dispute between Burns and Teton County 
may be materially different if any of the four defenses asserted by Bums is held to be 
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inapplicable, and with the hope of heading off yet another appeal that might otherwise result, 
Bums respectfully requests this Court to rule in its opinion on the applicability of each the Force 
Majeure Clause, the doctrine of prevention, the doctrine of impossibility, and the doctrine of 
quasi-estoppei. 
DATED this 19th day of April 2016. 
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By~~~ 
Brook B. Bond 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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